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China pe rspect i vesEditorial
Issues in Social Science Debate in
Xi Jinping’s China
CHLOÉ FROISSART
The social sciences are intimately linked to understanding the societiesin which we live. This is why the question of the historical and politicalanchoring of this knowledge arises. As postcolonial studies have
shown, the social sciences have produced theories, concepts, and paradigms
in Southern societies conveying a discourse on “modernity.” According to
Edward Said, scientific knowledge is a form of power that confers authority
on the person who produces it. However, knowledge is largely controlled and
produced by the West, which therefore has the power to name, represent,
and theorise (Said 1995). By entering into the field of these theories, indige-
nous researchers impose on themselves a representation of themselves and
the other that endorses these power relationships. In order to finally break
with this type of domination, indigenous societies are encouraged to move
away from the Western ethnocentrism carried by the social sciences, and
their particular vision of modernity, in order to construct their own narratives.
Issues of domination are therefore at the heart of the social sciences, and in
China as elsewhere, in the modern and contemporary period, these issues
have not ceased to be taken into account, discussed, and thwarted.
Historically, the birth of the human and social sciences in China at the
turn of the twentieth century is closely linked to the desire of intellectuals
to contribute to the emergence of a “powerful and prosperous” China
(fuqiang 富强) following its traumatic encounter with the Western powers
during the Opium Wars. As an integral part of the “self-reinforcing move-
ment” (yangwu yundong 洋务运动), which consisted of learning from the
West in order to better counter it, the human and social sciences, in China
as in other non-Western societies, from the start engaged the relationship
to the Other (the West) and to the Self. Trained for the most part abroad
and especially in Japan, a country through which Western concepts first
passed, Chinese researchers quickly strove to situate themselves in relation
to this Western knowledge. As early as the 1930s, in the wake of the soci-
ologist and anthropologist Fei Xiaotong in particular, many sought to “indi-
genise” the social sciences, in order to better understand the issues specific
to their country and to move in the direction of a specifically Chinese
modernity. The same dynamic is found in the aftermath of the Maoist pe-
riod, marked by the isolation of China and the ban on social sciences. The
“feverish” re-introduction of Western theories to fill the three-decade gap,
which marked the 1980s, was followed by a movement of critical re-ap-
propriation of these theories (Merle and Zhang 2007).
The lecture given by Xi Jinping in May 2016, during which the President
of the PRC called on Chinese researchers to “accelerate the construction of
a philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics” (jiakuai gou-
jian Zhongguo tese zhexue shehui kexue 加快构建中国特色哲学社会科学),
raises the question of the extent to which national characteristics are linked
to the social sciences of each country and to question the validity of epis-
temological relativism. Is the assertion of a national specificity of the dis-
ciplines compatible with the aim of the human and social sciences, and to
what extent can a scientific discourse or approach have cultural or national
characteristics? Xi Jinping’s speech also calls for an update on the long-
standing opposition between Western and Chinese social sciences, inherited
from postcolonial studies, which this discourse seems to mirror. What is the
significance of such an injunction today in China, and how do Chinese re-
searchers respond to it? Ultimately, this special issue aims to question the
relationship between knowledge and power, science and ideology in the
light of the Chinese case.
Differences that need to be addressed
The denunciation of ethnocentrism as it is formulated by postcolonial stud-
ies is based on the assumption that the scientific production on colonised
societies was anchored in and produced by relations of domination guiding
the construction of research objects in the human and social sciences. Can
we identify differences in the approach of the Chinese and Western social
sciences and in particular in the values  that underlie scientific discourse?
First of all, it should be remembered that ethnocentrism is far from being
concerned only with the way Western researchers might look at indigenous
societies. Ethnocentrism of culture, class, or even state is likely to influence
the approach of any researcher, regardless of their nationality and their ob-
ject of study. In China itself, cultural ethnocentrism dominated for a long
time the departments of studies of ethnic minorities (minzuxue 民族学),
while in the 1990s and early 2000s, ethnocentrism of class and state bur-
dened many sociological studies carried out on migrant workers. For a long
time, these studies designated these migrants as “peasant workers“ (nong-
mingong农民工) even though a growing proportion of them had never cul-
tivated the land and did not work in factories (Florence 2006; Froissart 2013),
while the difficulties of integration of these migrants in urban areas have
often been explained by an essentialist discourse – attributing these diffi-
culties to the “excessively low intrinsic quality” of migrants (suzhi tai di 素
质太低) – obliterating the responsibility of institutions such as hukou, the
political system, or public policies in the lack of integration of people of rural
origin in urban areas (Froissart 2013). As elsewhere, many Chinese researchers
have deviated from these ethnocentric biases thanks to observation that
“leads to access to the Self and to others at the methodological level” (Roul-
leau-Berger 2011: 34), less thanks to self-reflection on the position of the
researcher, a method more widespread in the French social sciences. (1)
The article by Aurélien Boucher, which opens this issue and is concerned
with the methods used by specialists in social history and sociology of the
       
          
       
         
        
             
           
        
    
          
        
         
     
         
 
         
       
            
          
          
      
        
   
         
   
        
   
         
       
              
   
          
1. On how the deconstruction of the categories of nongmingong and wailai renkou 外来人口 (peo-
ple coming from outside) by Chinese sociologists allowed the latter to influence the policies of
integration of migrants in the city in a progressive direction, see Froissart (2013: 227-31).
state, recalls that state ethnocentrism – that is to say the resumption of
state thinking conveyed by the categories and statistics forged by the state
– is a given faced by any researcher, regardless of nationality, working on the
action of the state, whatever that state may be. The scientific approach con-
sists of deconstructing this datum using methods that have no cultural or
national particularity, and whose validity is measured by the yardstick of
their heuristic value. In other words, what guarantees that the social sciences
maintain a scientific claim and are distinguished from ideology is the ele-
ment of the universal contained in their methods, even if these must often
be adapted to the particular constraints on access to archives – or to the
field – that require researchers to implement tips and tricks to get around
them. These tricks are an integral part of the scientific process, as they can
be replicated in the study of different countries to cope with similar con-
straints (e.g. to study power structures in the totalitarian societies of the
USSR and Maoist China) and in no way imply the similarity of the conclu-
sions, which invalidates any accusation of hegemony of scientific methods. 
If the social sciences are characterised first and foremost by a scientific
approach with a vocation to universality, the fact remains that they have
particular colorations specific to each country. There are different national
traditions based on their own textual traditions and concepts within a given
history, society, culture, and language. National traditions are also shaped
by the aim of social sciences in each country, which guides the way the
questions are asked. For example, the Chinese social sciences are more ap-
plied in the sense that they are primarily intended to help the state solve
social problems (Frenkiel 2014), while the critical dimension is inseparable
from the French tradition of social sciences. National traditions can also be
distinguished by methodological preferences: American social sciences place
more emphasis on quantitative methods and modelling than the French
social sciences, which prefer qualitative approaches (Froissart 2018). In
China, while the quantitative survey, in the form of a social survey, remains
dominant among sociologists because of the mission attributed to this dis-
cipline by the authorities, some sociologists and historians use oral histories
and life stories (Roulleau-Berger 2011), particularly to promote the voice
of individuals in the face of the Party’s monopoly on history and memory
(Froissart 2002; Merle 2004). As Gilles Guiheux and Wang Simeng point out
in this issue, institutional contexts, including academic systems and con-
ceptions of education and research training, also influence how social sci-
ences are practiced and taught in different countries. The article by Guiheux
and Wang, which focuses on the socialisation of young Chinese scholars in
France, provides an unparalleled perspective on how these differences are
perceived and experienced by those concerned, and underlines the proper
epistemological value of this experience. In fact, the experience of otherness,
especially through the work of translation, allows us to abandon a substan-
tialist and essentialist vision of concepts, thereby deconstructing categories.
These differences have constantly been taken into account by researchers,
both Chinese and Western, concomitantly with increasing circulation of
texts, ideas, students and researchers, as well as the opening of access to
the field and to archives; it is true that this effort of awareness, indigenisa-
tion, and ultimately reconciliation is an integral part of the pursuit of a sci-
entific approach in the social sciences.
In recent decades, Western researchers have constantly confronted their
concepts, theories, and paradigms in the field in China. In political science,
for example, researchers have extensively questioned the teleological
paradigm of democratisation that was dominant from the late 1980s to
the early 2000s. The work of Andrew Nathan, for example, which focused
in particular on questioning the designation of the 1989 movement as a
“democratic movement,” on elucidating what the Chinese and the reformers
of the 1980s meant by the word “democracy,” and on explaining “authori-
tarian resilience,” was a first step that opened the way for new questions
(Nathan 2008, 2003; Nathan et al. 2010). The abandonment of the
paradigm of democratisation has enabled researchers to gain the means of
understanding how the Chinese regime functions and maintains itself, de-
spite the growing development of protests and social organisations (Chen
2012; Cai 2008; Teets 2014), and to refine their understanding and definition
of the Chinese regime vis-à-vis other authoritarian regimes, as evidenced
by the emergence of new paradigms such as “consultative authoritarianism”
(Baum 2007; Teets 2014; Truex 2014), “responsive authoritarianism” (Heurlin
2016; Weller 2008; Su and Meng 2016), “deliberative authoritarianism” (He
and Warren 2011), and “participatory authoritarianism” (Duckett and Wang
2013), an invitation to consider how the Chinese regime presents and ar-
ticulates certain forms of hybridity. A further step is taken in the decon-
struction of paradigms when Western theories and concepts are not only
put to the test of the Chinese fieldwork but redesigned from it; in other
words when one wonders what the Chinese case brings to theories of the
social sciences. The work in political sociology by Kevin O’Brien and his col-
laborators is a reference in this field and has influenced many of the studies
cited above. Basing oneself on the field and on interviews to show what the
Chinese mean by the terms “representation,” “institutionalisation,” or “elec-
tion” makes it possible, as a first step, to become aware of how these con-
cepts are for Western researchers rooted in a liberal conception peculiar to
pluralist democracies and thus do not constitute operational analytical tools
for understanding politics in China, where they have very different meanings
(O’Brien 2018). As a second step, this approach is an invitation to elaborate
new concepts with the yardstick of the Chinese experience, which makes it
possible to apprehend the latter otherwise than as a mere negative (which
it is not). O’Brien’s work on protest in China embodies in an emblematic
way this double movement of deconstruction of Western concepts and de-
velopment of new concepts through the dialogue between theory (of social
movements in this case) and Chinese terrain. Having shown that collective
actions in China are neither “transgressive” nor “contained” but have char-
acteristics of these two categories clearly distinguished in the work of
MacAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2) (O’Brien 2003), O’Brien and Li come to de-
velop the concept of “rightful resistance,” a concept that also reflects a type
of resistance that is not specific to China but is found in other countries
(O’Brien and Li 2006). The mobility of the concept of “rightful resistance”
testifies to its scientific nature while denying the exceptionality of the ob-
ject “China.” The work of testing the normative categories inherited from
the Western social sciences carried out by many political scientists of China
in the wake of O’Brien leads some researchers today to question what is
political in China at a level below open opposition to the CCP and challenge
to the regime, and to take an interest in different forms of civic engagement
and mobilisation (Froissart 2014; Wu and Shen 2016; Wu 2017) demon-
strating the capacity of actors to “negotiate authoritarianism” (Froissart
2017). These researchers do not abandon themselves to relativism, since
they do not completely question the normative categories and show, on
the contrary, how these forms of mobilisation, civic engagement, and par-
ticipation contribute to the stability and sustainability of a regime that re-
mains characterised as authoritarian.
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2. “Neither transgressive nor contained but boundary-spanning contention.”
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Nor are Chinese researchers the victims of Western paradigms that they
might reproduce in a non-critical way. Since the 1930s, they have sought to
adapt the social sciences, which emerged in a Western context, to the Chinese
context in order to be able to grasp the questions that were specific to it. So-
ciologists and anthropologists, including Fei Xiaotong, have devoted themselves
to the work of indigenisation of essentially exogenous concepts and theories.
If the years 1980-1990 constituted a period of all-out reintroduction of West-
ern theories to make up for the backwardness of the three decades of the
Maoist period, which were marked by the closure to the West and the disap-
pearance of the Chinese social sciences, this period of indiscriminate reintro-
duction (nalaizhuyi 拿来主义 (3)) has today given way to an effort of
re-appropriation paving the way for the hybridisation of knowledge. The im-
pressive panorama of Chinese sociology provided by Laurence Roulleau-Berger
testifies to the way in which Chinese sociologists reclaim and sharpen the con-
cepts derived from both American and French theories in the light of a Chinese
field increasingly better taken into account as ethnographic methods develop.
Far from the simplistic opposition between Western and Chinese social sci-
ences, which does not account for the differences in traditions and approaches
within the social sciences of a given country, some Chinese researchers give
evidence of a detailed and specific approach to the various currents of the so-
cial sciences, which they grasp in order to situate and adapt them to the Chi-
nese context (Roulleau-Berger 2011, 2016). For example, Shen Yuan, a professor
at Tsinghua University, contributed to the sociology of action and sociological
intervention inspired by Touraine (Shen 2007). Jean-Louis Rocca’s work reports
on debates about the category of the “middle class” among Chinese sociolo-
gists and how this notion adapts to the Chinese context (Rocca 2008, 2017).
Beyond the mere adaptation of Western theories, some Chinese researchers
have managed to question the so-called universality of certain paradigms and
thus to permanently influence the social sciences. This is the case, for example,
with the anthropologist Cai Hua – trained in France and inspired by Françoise
l’Héritier – whose study of the Naxi ethnic group, A Society Without Fathers
or Husbands, hailed as a major turning point in France and in the United States,
challenges the Levi-Straussian paradigm of the universality of marriage (Hua
1997). As Aurélien Boucher (2018) aptly points out, “Hua’s epistemology lies
within the social sciences, not against them.”
In view of the work of reflexivity, observation, and dialogue conducted by
Chinese and Western researchers, levelling charges of colonialism or hege-
monism at the social science work on China produced in the West today
appears in many ways to be unjust and outdated. The processes of circula-
tion and hybridisation of the social and human sciences from one country
to another have come to belie the opposition between Chinese and Western
social sciences, themselves highly reifying and essentialising categories. In
political philosophy, for example, the theory of liberalism and the paradigm
of transitology have often been presented as utterly Western. But there is
a Chinese liberalism, embodied in the 1920s and 30s by figures such as Hu
Shi and today by intellectuals such as Xu Youyu, Zhu Xueqin, Qin Hui, and
Liu Junning (Froissart 2001; Frenkiel 2014), while an intellectual such as
Xiao Gongqin, leader of the neoconservatives, subscribes to the paradigm
of transitology to give his own version of the Chinese transition (Xiao 2012).
This paradigm has also been widely revisited by Chinese sociologists seeking
to understand the transformations of Chinese society without necessarily
assigning an a priori finality to these transformations other than that of
progressing in a properly Chinese way; that is to say, without presupposing
the point of arrival (Merle and Lun 2007). While there are differences be-
tween the social sciences in each country, these differences are destined to
be absorbed in scientific work and the globalisation of knowledge: theories,
concepts, and paradigms are bound to be refined, challenged, and replaced
by researchers from all countries and all origins. Similarly, more than re-
searchers in the hard sciences, researchers in the humanities and social sci-
ences are dependent on their subjectivity and in part determined by their  
cultural and political values in the choice of their research subject, in the
questions they pose, and the way they seek to respond to them. But the
particularising prism of these values  is bound to fade away in the face of
the logic of a discourse that becomes more coherent as it responds to con-
tradiction and integrates new empirical data. It is this very movement of
the scientific process that constitutes the common substrate for the social
sciences, which makes them remain sciences, and which enables the dia-
logue and the progress of knowledge to continue.
The article by Guiheux and Wang, however, invites us not to minimise
non-epistemological differences – such as the differences in the conception
of the figure of the researcher and what is expected of him by the author-
ities on which he depends, as well as in research funding and how research
is assessed and valued – which establish the framework in which researchers
practice in each country. Young researchers trained in France are confronted
with a labour market in China where the scientific skills acquired in France
(such as critical thinking and interdisciplinarity) are not valued, while they
are asked for skills to meet the CCP’s calls for projects and professional
strategies, especially publication strategies, that allow China to figure promi-
nently in the new global research economy, in which France is marginalised.
These differences in university systems need to be taken into account, as
they may constitute obstacles to the internationalisation of researchers and
research and thus to the progress of knowledge.
The return of hegemonism, or what talking
about a “model” means
Now it is the maintenance of this fear of Western hegemonism in the so-
cial sciences that leads to wanting to impose a Chinese hegemonism in re-
turn. Widely reported by the State media, the lecture given by Xi Jinping
provides a vade mecum of “Chinese” research, (4) which we can try to sum-
marise in a few sentences. The social sciences are from the start invested
with a political and strategic role “of the highest importance” insofar as
they must allow China to place itself “at the forefront of the world.” Re-
searchers are called on to support the leadership and governing capacity of
the CCP, not only by helping it to make better-informed decisions through
expertise to inform public policy and address the risks of destabilisation of
the regime, but also by contributing to “theoretical innovation.” This theo-
retical innovation aims to give meaning and coherence “to the 30 years of
development” during which China has established itself as the second
largest economic power in the world, to create new concepts of develop-
ment to accelerate the transformation of the mode of development at the
global level, and thus promote a world civilisation of Chinese origin, bringing
economic prosperity and spiritual direction to humanity. For this, researchers
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3. For a critique of “nalaizhuyi,” see for example Qin (1999).
4. “哲学社会科学,习近平为何强调中国特色” (Zhexue shehui kexue, Xi Jinping weihe qiangdiao
Zhongguo tese, Philosophy and Social Sciences, why Xi Jinping focuses on Chinese peculiarities),
Xinhua wang, 12 June 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-06-12/c_129036629.html
(accessed on 16 November 2018); “习近平:构建中国特色哲学社会科学” (Xi Jinping: goujian
Zhongguo tese zhexue shehui kexue, Xi Jinping: building a philosophy and social sciences with
Chinese characteristics), Xuexi Zhongguo, 22 May 2016, http://news.china.com.cn/2016-
05/22/content_38509942.htm (accessed on 16 November 2018).
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are enjoined to set out from Marxism, guarantor of “a right understanding
and a right belief,” and to stick to that system of thinking that has allowed
China to reach the level of development and influence it enjoys today.
Marxism provides both an ideological “guide” and “a correct method for
better observing and interpreting the phenomena of nature, human society,
and human thought, and revealing the laws they contain.” Chinese re-
searchers must assimilate the social sciences contributions of other coun-
tries “without forgetting their roots and their culture” and synthesise these
contributions through Marxism. They must also excavate traditional Chinese
culture and demonstrate its excellence while adapting it to modern soci-
ety (5) to give it a power of attraction across borders and times. In order to
build a “scientific power,” the Chinese social sciences must respond to “six
characteristics”: to be part of a heritage, a nation, an originality of their own,
but also of the contemporary era and display a systematic and scientific
professionalism. In short, it is about “creating disciplinary systems with Chi-
nese characteristics and universal significance.” Finally, the challenge of de-
veloping a “discourse system peculiar to Chinese philosophy and social
science” is intimately linked to combating the “humiliation” of which China
is a victim and is necessary to “achieve the goal of a struggle that has lasted
for two centuries and achieve the great revival of the Chinese nation.” 
The indigenisation of the social sciences and philosophy advocated here
by Xi Jinping is rooted in a “fetishisation of cultural difference” (Dirlik 2013),
a difference characterised by a methodological particularism and a political
aim imposed on the disciplines. In other words, the notion of model refers
as much to the prescriptive character of an exogenous approach to science
imposed on researchers as to the ideological and domineering aim at-
tributed to knowledge, these two dimensions being intimately linked. The
characteristic of the model, in which it is fundamentally part of a relation-
ship of domination, is that it is intended to be exported, or even imposed,
by means other than its sole strength of scientific persuasion. This is the
meaning given by Xi Jinping to scientific collaborations, partnerships with
foreign universities, the establishment of Chinese research centres abroad,
and Chinese scientific journals of international rank, which are an integral
part of Chinese soft power, and which the President calls, in his conference,
to develop. The social sciences are ultimately summoned to serve the na-
tionalist ambition of the “Chinese dream” by allowing China to take revenge
for the humiliation inflicted by the Opium Wars, as a result of which intel-
lectuals and reformers forged a Western model – be it technical, political,
or philosophical – to emulate in order to fight the West, while feeding a re-
jection of their own culture on the yardstick of this model. The injunction
that is given here to Chinese scholars is that of winning the battle of ideas
against a largely imaginary enemy, in other words certainly more internal
than external, by proposing a model of alternative modernity capable of
competing with the Euro-American conception of modernity, of liberal and
capitalist inspiration. Thus the renaissance of the great Chinese nation will
be completed by its ability to theorise and export this alternative model of
modernity and “civilisation.” And what matter that this Marxist civilisation
that the CCP calls for is rooted in a Western theory, since it is indeed a Marx-
ism with Chinese tendencies, one of the postulates being that the PRC is a
“socialist” country, and therefore prohibits Chinese scholars from using
paradigms such as “class consciousness” or “class struggle,” which are inap-
propriate to account for China’s political and cultural reality. (6)
Despite its obvious lack of coherence, this vade mecum of Chinese research
is part of a research governance that allows the CCP to impose it. While the
universities and research institutes have always been under the tutelage of
the Party (a Party secretary is attached to each institution, and within it to
each faculty), the influence of the Party and in particular of its First Secretary
has grown considerably in recent years. Western textbooks have been
banned, ideological work has been stepped up, criticism has been strongly
discouraged, and teacher-researchers have been explicitly called on to sup-
port the PRC’s political system (Froissart 2018: 358). Following the afore-
mentioned conference and the enshrining of Xi Jinping Thought in the
Constitution at the 19th CCP Congress in October 2017, “institutes for the
study of Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a
new era” were created in many universities in China. Funded by the Party
School of the CCP Central Committee, the Ministry of Education, the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, the National Defence University of the People’s
Liberation Army, the municipalities and provinces, and universities them-
selves, these institutes aim to promote Xi’s thinking and favour his interpre-
tation. (7) Even before the establishment of these institutes, Chinese
academics were already being regularly invited to “study” meetings that
some people describe, often with great distance and humour, as “brainwash-
ing” (xinao洗脑), while their writings have been scrutinised by the censorship
of Party committees in the universities. When they turn away from ortho-
doxy, it is not uncommon for researchers to be banned from publishing or
teaching, to be unable to get a job or a promotion, or even to be dismissed
from office. (8) This political influence is reinforced by the fact that research
is entirely driven by sources of funding monopolised by the CCP. Each year,
the Leading Group for Research Planning in Philosophy and Social Sciences
(Quanguo zhexue shehui kexue guihua lingdao xiaozu 全国哲学社会科学规
划领导小组) publishes research funding programs (guojia keji国家科技) ac-
companied by a guide (zhinan指南) indicating the topics that will be funded
for the year in each discipline. At the forefront of the disciplines are “Marxism
and socialist scientific thought” (132 subjects proposed for the year 2017
as against 85 for 2016) as well as “the history of the Party and the construc-
tion of the Party” (108 for the year 2017 against 96 for 2016). (9) The disci-
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5. This approach is supposed to allow the “most fundamental cultural genes of the Chinese nation
to be adapted to contemporary culture.”
6. On the sinisation of Marxism, see in particular Dirlik (2000). On the perplexity in which the ban
on using the paradigm of class struggle has plunged some Chinese researchers, see for example:
Xia Xiyan 夏夕烟, “中国社会科学网: ‘以阶级斗争为纲’的标签不能乱贴” (Zhongguo shehui
kexue wang: ‘Yi jieji douzheng wei gang’ de biaoqian buneng luan tie, Website of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences: One cannot misunderstand the meaning of the formula ‘take the
class struggle as main axis’), Ifeng, 5 October 2014, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20141005/4214
1206_0.shtml (accessed on 23 November 2018).
7. Tsinghua University Newsletter, January-February 2018, http://news.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/
thunewsen/index.html (accessed on 19 November 2018).
8. Informal interviews with academics at Tsinghua University in Beijing, Sun Yat-sen University in
Guangzhou and East China Normal University in Shanghai, between 2014 and 2018. Lay-offs or
even imprisonment of well-known researchers in China have been widely reported by the press,
see for example: “Peaceful advocate for Muslim Uiguhrs in China sentenced to life imprisonment,”
The Guardian, 23 September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/23/xinjiang-
china-short-ilham-tohti-muslim-uighur-life-in-prison (accessed on 23 November 2018); “Modern
Chinese intellectuals are spineless: Peking University Vice Dean reportedly resigned after provoca-
tive essay,” SupChina, 27 March 2018, https://supchina.com/2018/03/27/modern-chinese-intel-
lectuals-are-spineless-peking-university-vice-dean-reportedly-resigns-after-provocative-essay/?fb
clid=IwAR3zWG_Bn6m75edqaqqurbQhdI6oKCVUuTxDzRsVckj6HtheAinjEFIVvC8 (accessed on
23 November 2018).
9. 全国社会哲学科学规划办公室 (Quanguo shehui zhexue kexue guihua bangongshi, National Of-
fice of Social Science and Philosophy Planning), 国家社会科学基金项目 2016 年度科技指南
(Guojia shehui kexue jijin xiangmu 2016 niandu keji zhinan, Guide for the year 2016 of state
funded human and social sciences projects), 15 December 2015, http://www.npopss-
cn.gov.cn/n1/2015/1215/c219469-27929558.html (accessed on 19 November 2018); 全国社会
哲学科学规划办公室 (Quanguo shehui zhexue kexue guihua bangongshi, National Office of So-
cial Science Planning and Philosophy), 国家社会科学基金项目2017 年度科技指南 (Guojia she-
hui kexue jijin xiangmu 2017 niandu keji zhinan, Guide for the year 2017 of projects in the
humanities and social sciences financed by the State), 16 December 2016, http://www.npopss-
cn.gov.cn/n1/2016/1216/c220863-28956126.html (accessed on 19 November 2018).
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plines with the most subjects being financed are law (165 for 2016), man-
agement (155 for 2016), and economic theory (135), as against 18 for world
history. It should be emphasised, however, that this steering of research by
the authorities through funding is not unique to China, and that, as else-
where, Chinese social scientists are now familiar with the art of “packaging”
their research projects in the Newspeak of the Party in order to obtain the
funds they need to conduct research over which they still retain partial con-
trol.
But the power of Party-funded research funding is not to be underesti-
mated. In 2017, China spent 1.75 trillion yuan (US$ 279 billion) on research
and development, according to the Chinese Minister of Science, an increase
of 14% over the previous year. (10) In other words, the CCP is now able to
implement the hegemony that it hopes for because of the colossal resources
at its disposal to fund research not only by Chinese but also by foreign re-
searchers. An increasing number of academic institutions around the world
are now dependent on Chinese funding, which can come through project
funding, Confucius Institutes, or sending students who pay high tuition fees
abroad. Under these conditions, only a few major American universities have
the means to put an end to their partnerships with Chinese universities
when they believe that these partnerships challenge their values  of freedom
of research and researchers, as Cornell University did recently following the
persecution by Renmin University of students who consider themselves
Marxists and who had helped Shenzhen workers asking for the creation of
a union in their factory. (11) Similarly, there is now a convergence between
the imperatives of economic profitability of major publishing houses in the
social sciences and the censorship objectives of the Chinese government,
as recalled by the fact that Cambridge University Press (CUP) and Springer,
under the threat of no longer being able to distribute in China, have agreed
to block access to articles and censor passages of books that are deemed
to be sensitive. Only the vigilance and mobilisation of Western researchers
forced China Quarterly, owned by CUP, to restore access to censored articles
during a scandal that marked the summer of 2017. (12)
As for Chinese researchers, confronted with contradictory injunctions both
to contribute to the development of an ideology peculiar to China and to
universal scientific knowledge, do they succeed in maintaining a real scien-
tific agenda and, if so, how?
Chinese researchers’ answers to the
injunction of power
This injunction is of course far from unanimous among Chinese re-
searchers, and the way in which they respond is not univocal. Some profes-
sors, such as Xie Yu, director of Peking University’s Social Studies Centre and
a Professor at Princeton, even try to translate the CCP’s injunction into more
meaningful and constructive terms for their colleagues and students. If, ac-
cording to Xie, the way of asking the questions by Chinese social scientists
is relatively well contextualised, “the application of Western theories still
has insufficient local relevance, because of sociologists’ lack of understand-
ing the way of doing good research.” This way of underlining that the “graft-
ing” of theories lurks in the path of any researcher in the process of learning
his profession, and is not necessarily to be blamed on any hegemonism,
makes the question of indigenisation appear in some respects as a “pseudo
problem.” And to conclude: “If we can take into account the sociological
context while adhering to the codified nature of sociology [as a scientific
discipline], Chinese sociology will inevitably maintain its academic inde-
pendence and originality. (13) These statements show that even in Xi’s China
there is a place for the researcher’s critical distance and autonomy of
thought. There is also room for quality research that is well reflected in so-
ciology in the great work of knowledge transmission performed by Laurence
Roulleau-Berger, to whose books we refer. The last two articles in this issue
offer a more contrasting picture of Chinese research, Samuli Seppänen’s ar-
ticle highlighting a suffocation of creativity in the theory of law, while Cora-
line Goron’s article, concerning theories of sustainable development,
emphasises the ability of researchers to negotiate with the authorities
within certain limits, and therefore to show some creativity.
Seppänen’s text shows how the political constraints on research have
partly contributed to the development of an anti-formalist current in the
theory of law in China. While this trend, as in other Western countries, was
partly motivated by the recognition that a certain degree of flexibility in
the application of the law is necessary in order to better meet social needs,
it is primarily aimed at encouraging judges to take into account the funda-
mental interests of the state and the Party, which fear above all the sub-
versive power of a judgment of law that would be rendered autonomously.
Also, according to Seppänen, China presents a particular form of anti-for-
malism to the extent that it supports the authoritarian political system,
where in the West it was an integral part of the movement for the promo-
tion of social democracy. In other words, the strictly scientific justification
of this stream of legal thought is not peculiar to China, since it corresponds
to a model that has been tested since the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury at world level, while the specifically Chinese elaboration of this theo-
retical position cannot be exported, since it has no scientific value, and only
has a political value that meets the authoritarian constraints of the Chinese
context. In this, Seppänen is in accord with Boucher: the validity of a theory
or a method – and therefore its capacity to be exported – can only be es-
tablished by reference to its heuristic value, which would seem to undercut
any ambition of the CCP to develop and export a Chinese social science
model.
Goron’s article, which deals with the circulation of a “concept” – that of
ecological civilisation – produced primarily by the authorities between the
political and academic spheres, leads to a more nuanced conclusion. The
theoretical ambition around what would be more accurately called a slogan
corresponds in every respect to the ambition of the Chinese government
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to export an ideological model, which would in this case be able to revolu-
tionise a world economic order that is predatory for the environment. But
while the scientific investment of the term “ecological civilisation” serves
the political agenda of the Party and contributes to its political legitimisa-
tion, it is also used as a cover by some researchers to put forward scientific
criticisms of the Chinese environmental governance system and formulate
suggestions for reform. On the one hand, the concept of ecological civilisa-
tion circumscribes scientific and public discourse to what is acceptable to
the Party by preventing critical debate on capitalism, democracy, and au-
thoritarianism. On the other hand, researchers are re-appropriating this con-
cept and helping to develop it scientifically according to their respective
disciplinary approaches, thus contributing to the global scientific discussion
on sustainable development. In other words, the article shows that the con-
stant tension between propaganda and science that characterises Chinese
academic circles can also give rise, in certain circumstances, to innovative
scientific developments, thus joining the tried-and-true principle that con-
straints can also be a source of creativity. But at the same time it should be
made clear that the opposite can be just as true. In legal theory, according
to Seppänen, “attempts to make sense of ‘Chinese realities’ are thwarted
by ideological taboos that prevent researchers from assessing the Chinese
system of governance in frank and honest terms,”  as much as by the con-
straint imposed on them to start from ideology rather than from concrete
reality, and the absence of an adequate discursive environment.
To conclude briefly, we could emphasise that if there is a particular and
probably irreducible specificity to the Chinese social sciences, it is the polit-
ical hold of the CCP on research with which researchers must constantly
contend, and the injunction to create a model that does not exist in countries
where research autonomy is institutionalised. Undoubtedly, it is this hege-
mony that helps to curb the efforts at dialogue by Chinese and Western re-
searchers, and prevents the Chinese social sciences from taking their rightful
place in the international scientific arena. But it is also for this reason that
these efforts at dialogue constitute an urgent task of the highest importance.
z Translated by Michael Black.
z Chloé Froissart is Associate Professor in political science at the
University of Rennes 2 and the former director of the Tsinghua
University Sino-French Centre in Social Sciences
(chloefroissart@gmail.com).
8 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 8 / 4
Editorial
N o . 2 0 1 8 / 4  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 9
Chloé Froissart – Issues in Social Science Debate in Xi Jinping’s China
References
BAUM, Richard. 2007. “The limits of ‘authoritarian resilience.” Conference
at Sciences-Po-CERI, Paris, 17 January 2007.
BOUCHER, Aurélien. 2018. Review of Laurence Roulleau Berger, Post-West-
ern Revolution in Sociology (Brill, 2016), https://www.theoryculturesoci-
ety.org/review-of-laurence-roulleau-berger-post-western-revolution-in-so
ciology/ (accessed on 19 November 2018).
CAI, Yongshun. 2008. “Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious
Politics in China.” British Journal of Political Science 38: 411-32.
CHEN, Xi. 2012. Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
DIRLIK, Arif. 2000. “Theory, History, Culture: Cultural Identity and the Pol-
itics of Theory in Twentieth-century China.” Development and Society
29(2): 73-104.
DIRLIK, Arif. 2013. “Thinking Modernity Historically: Is ‘Alternative Moder-
nity’ the Answer?.” Asian Review of World Histories 1(1): 5-44.
DUCKETT, Jane, and Hua WANG. 2013. “Extending Political Participation
in China: New Opportunities for Citizens in the Policy Process.” Journal of
Asian Public Policy 6(3): 263-76.
FLORENCE, Éric. 2006. “Debates and Classification Struggles Regarding
the Representation of Migrant Workers.” China Perspectives 65: 15-27.
FRENKIEL, Émilie. 2014. Parler politique en Chine. Les intellectuels chinois
pour ou contre la démocratie (Conditional democracy: The contemporary
debate on political reform in Chinese universities). Paris: Presses universi-
taires de France.
FROISSART, Chloé. 2001. “La renaissance du libéralisme chinois dans les
années 1990” (The rebirth of Chinese liberalism in the 1990s). Esprit 280:
112-25.
FROISSART, Chloé. 2002. “Xu Youyu: How to Write the History of Cultural
Revolution to Guide China’s Future.” China Perspectives 42: 15-23.
FROISSART, Chloé. 2013. La Chine et ses migrants, la conquête d’une
citoyenneté (China and its migrants). Rennes: Presses Universitaires de
Rennes.
FROISSART, Chloé. 2014. “Using the Law as a ‘Harmonious Weapon’: The
Ambiguities of Legal Activism in Favour of Migrant Workers in China.” Jour-
nal of Civil Society 10(3): 255-72.
FROISSART, Chloé. 2017. “Negotiating Authoritarianism and its Limits:
Worker-led Collective Bargaining in Guangdong Province.” China Informa-
tion 32(1): 23-45.
FROISSART, Chloé. 2018. “Changing Pattern of Chinese Civil Society: Com-
paring the Hu-Wen and Xi Jinping Eras.” In Willy Wo-Lap Lam (ed.), Rout-
ledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party. New York: Routledge.
352-71.
HE, Baogang, and Mark E. WARREN. 2011. “Authoritarian Deliberation: The
Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development.” Perspectives on Pol-
itics 9(2): 269-89.
HEURLIN, Christopher. 2016. Responsive Authoritarianism in China. Land,
Protests and Policy Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
HUA, Cai. 1997. Une société sans père ni mari. Les Na de Chine (A society
without father or husband). Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
MERLE, Aurore. 2004. “Towards a Chinese Sociology for ‘Communist Civil-
isation’“ China Perspectives 52: 4-15.
NATHAN, Andrew J. 2003. “Authoritarian Resilience.” Journal of Democracy
14(1): 6-17.
NATHAN, Andrew J. 2008. “Zhao Ziyang’s Vision of Democracy.” China
Perspectives 2018(3): 136-42.
NATHAN, Andrew J., et al. 2010. How East Asians View Democracy. New
York: Columbia University Press.
O’BRIEN, Kevin J. 2003. “Neither Transgressive nor Contained: Boundary-
spanning Contention in China.” Mobilization 8(1): 51-64.
O’BRIEN, Kevin J., and Lianjiang LI. 2006. Rightful Resistance in Rural China.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
O’BRIEN, Kevin J. 2018. “Speaking to the Theory and Speaking to the China
Field.” To be published in Issues and Studies 54(4).
QIN Hui 秦晖. 1999. 问题与主义 (Wenti yu zhuyi, Problems and doctrines).
Changchun: Changchun chubanshe.
ROCCA, Jean-Louis. 2008. La société chinoise vue par ses sociologues (Chi-
nese society seen through its sociologists). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
ROCCA, Jean-Louis. 2017. The Making of the Chinese Middle-class. Small
Comfort and Great Expectations. New York: Palgrave McMillan.
ROULLEAU-BERGER, Laurence. 2011. Désoccidentaliser la sociologie. L’Eu-
rope au miroir de la Chine (De-westernising sociology. Europe in the mirror
of China). La Tour-d’Aigues: Éditions de l’Aube.
ROULLEAU-BERGER, Laurence. 2016. Post-Western Revolution in Sociol-
ogy. Leiden: Brill.
SAID, Edward. 1995. Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient. Lon-
don: Pingouin.
WELLERN, Robert P. 2008. “Responsive Authoritarianism.” In Bruce Gilley
and Larry Diamond (eds.), Political Change in China: Comparison with Tai-
wan. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 117-34.
SHEN Yuan. 2007. “‘Intervention forte’ et ‘intervention faible’: deux voies
d’intervention sociologique (‘Strong intervention’ and ‘weak intervention’:
two forms of sociological intervention)” In Aurore Merle and Lun Zhang
(eds.), La Chine en transition: regards sociologiques (China in transition).
Cahiers internationaux de sociologie 122: 73-104.
SU, Zheng, and Tianguang MENG. 2016. “Selective Responsiveness: Online
Public Demands and Government Responsiveness in Authoritarian China.”
Social Science Research 59: 52-67.
TEETS, Jessica. 2014. Civil Society Under Authoritarianism. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
TRUEX, Rory. 2014. “Consultative Authoritarianism and its Limits.” Com-
parative Political Studies 50(3): 329-61.
WU, Fengshi, and Shen YANG. 2016. “Web 2.0 and Political Engagement
in China.” Voluntas 27: 2055-76.
WU, Fengshi. 2017. “Evolving State-Society Relations in China: Introduc-
tion.” The China Review 17(2): 1-6.
XIAO, Gongqin. 2012. “从维权政治到宪政民主的五步逻辑” (Cong wei-
quan zhengzhi dao xianzheng minzhu de wubu luoji, From authoritarian-
ism to constitutional democracy: a five-steps logic), Dongfang zaobao,
18 January.
